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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In this paper we study a notion of complementarity (and substitutability) between goods
that is:
(1) not based on price variations;
(2) behavioural: it just uses choice data as inputs;
(3) model free: it does not commit to any specic cognitive procedure underlying the
choice data.
To motivate this program, suppose that a local government wants to know whether
two free public attractions, say a museum and a park, are complements or substitutes.
The authority would be surprised to hear that this situation does not t directly the
textbook criteria for complementarity, which are based on price elasticities while in this
case both prices are xed at zero. The authority may also be surprised to hear that
the gold standard concept of Hicksian complementarity is based on the assumption that
agents are utility maximisers.1
Of course, any well-bred economist could explain to the authority that it is always
possible to retrieve implicit prices. To illustrate, one could check the impact of having
the park located at di¤erent distances from the museum, observe the resulting e¤ect on
the demand for the museum, impute a value to the time needed to move between the
two attractions, and then calculate an elasticity based on such values. Because it may
be somewhat impractical to experiment with moving the park at various distances, the
impact would be estimated from the observations of analogous e¤ects relating to other
museums and other parks, and these e¤ects would be adjusted for the various factors
a¤ecting demand in the di¤erent locations. But, while this standard type of methodology
1It merits noting in this respect that goverments are more and more advised by behavioural economics
units. These include the US O¢ce of Information and Regulatory A¤airs, which led to the institution of
the US governments Social and Behavioral Sciences Team in July 2015; the Behaviour Insights team in
the UK, established in 2010 and then spun o¤ into a separate company in 2014; the Behavioural Insights
Unit established in 2012 as part of the New South Wales Premier and Cabinets o¢ce. The German
Chancellery is in the process of setting up a similar unit. Several other governmental units and groups
exist in various countries and in the European Union Directorates General.
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has merits2, it is fair to say that it is very indirect and thus its validity necessarily rests
on several assumptions (regarding the imputed value of time, the comparisons across lo-
cations, the specication of the model that generates demand, etcetera). And the fact
remains that Hicksian compensated elasticities are meaningful only within a utility max-
imisation framework. The recent econometric approaches that deal with the zero price
problem, pioneered by Gentzkow [14] typically assume an additive Random Utility Model
(RUM) such as the multinomial logit and variations thereof (see section 2 for a discus-
sion). However, the recent wave of abstract works on stochastic choice (e.g. Brady and
Rhebeck [9], Echenique, Saito and Tserenjigmid [13], Gül, Natenzon and Pesendorfer [15],
Manzini and Mariotti [17] among others) has highlighted a wide variety of possible choice
errors and choice procedures, and so a number of reasons why agents behaviour might
fail to be described by a logit model, and indeed even by the much larger class of RUMs.
We take the view that price variations are just a tool to check complementarity: the
notion of complementarity itself is not intrinsically related to price variations. Further-
more, we also take the view that complementarity is meaningful independently of whether
people maximise utility or not. We take seriously the multiplicity of plausible models and
the consequent di¢culty of model selection. For these reasons we look for denitions that
complement those of the standard approach.
The scope of interest of this program is quite vast, rstly because consumption may
be non-rational in many di¤erent ways, and secondly because zero prices are observed
for many other goods beside public attractions: online newspapers, reviews/advice (e.g.
nancial) on social networks, public radio broadcasts, le sharing are often free. Another
leading example is that of complementarity in business practices, such as training the
workforce and allowing it more decisional discretion (Brynjolfson and Milgrom [10]). More
abstractly, the goods may be characteristics embodied in the objects of choice, so that
any price variation is perfectly correlated between the goods. In some cases, prices may
be especially di¢cult to conceptualise: is beauty a complement or a substitute of wealth
in a partner?
2A neat early example of the methodology is Becker and Murphys [4] analysis of the complementarity
between advertising and advertised goods based on the implicit price of commercials, which are shown
on television without a price. If networks stopped showing commercials, the public would have to pay
for television content. The change in the price of content is the implicit price of commercials.
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1.2 The basic ideas
Complementarity between goods means intuitively that they go together. How can this
concept be made operational?
The rst idea in our analysis is to use stochastic choice data as a primitive. Because
we are not going to exploit responses to price variation, and more in general the variation
of choices across menus, we lose some information compared to the classical approach. To
obviate this, we consider instead a multiplicity of choices from a xed menu, in the form
of choice frequencies. The rich structure of this type of data is an alternative source of
information about underlying complementarities.
Secondly, we suggest that two basic principles should be examined:
a) Statistical Association: if choice data come in the form of frequencies then the
consumption of complementary goods should exhibit some kind of statistical association.
Association is precisely what it means to go together in statistical language. Indeed, in
the literature about complementarities in business practices, the positive correlation (or
clustering) of practices is the most common complementarity test3.
b) Revealed preference: Consuming the goods jointly should not in itself be evidence
of substitutability; consuming the goods individually should not in itself be evidence of
complementarity. This principle seem almost self-evident from an economic point of view
if choices must convey information about complementarity. It is also fundamental from
a welfare perspective. Interest in complementarity is often a consequence of a welfare
question, such as is it welfare enhancing to build a park next to the existing museum?
or would introducing a new product be welfare enhancing for the consumers (so that
he would be willing to pay more)?. We take the classical view that an agents choices
encode welfare information, and that, as articulated by Bernheim and Rangel [6], they
do so whether the agent is rational or not. It would be odd if the local authority, having
decided that the construction of the park is in the interest of the community, was dissuaded
after learning that the joint consumption of park and museum in a similar location has
increased.
3See e.g. Brynjolfson and Milgrom [10], p.33.
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1.3 Preview of results
Consider two goods, say the online and the print versions of a newspaper. As in Gentzkow
[14], the data come in the form (pOP ; pO; pP ; p?), where pO and pP denote the consumption
frequency of the online version only and of the print version only, respectively; pOP denotes
the frequency of joint consumption; and p? denotes the frequency with which neither
version is read.
Lets consider the statistical principle discussed above. For simplicity, lets also focus in
this section on association as correlation (this is just for concreteness: later on we will use
a much more abstract concept). Then we would say the two versions are complementary
whenever they are positively correlated, that is, when the posterior probability of reading
one version conditional on reading the other version, pOP
pOP+pP
, is greater than the prior
probability, pOP + pO.
It is easily shown, however, that this property atly contradicts the intuitive revealed
preference view that increases in joint consumption do not constitute evidence of substi-
tutability. Suppose that the data are given by the following table
Read Print Did not read print
Read Online 0:3 0:2
Did not read online 0:2 0:3
that is (pOP ; pO; pP ; p?) = (0:3; 0:2; 0:2; 0:3). Then the data indicate a positive correlation
( pOP
pOP+pP
= 0:6 > 0:5 = pOP + pO). Suppose now that joint consumption rises to p0OP =
0:55 while single good consumptions stay the same. Then the correlation turns negative
( p
0
OP
p0
OP
+p0
P
= 0:73 < 0:75 = p0OP + p
0
O). An increase in joint consumption has transformed
the goods from complementary to substitutes!
Our rst main contribution is to show that this simple example illustrates a deeper
conict between two seemingly natural properties that criteria for complementarity should
satisfy. One is monotonicity, embodying the revealed preference principle: an increase in
joint consumption accompanied by (weak) decreases in single good consumption should
not overturn an existing complementarity (and analogously for substitutability).
The second property is duality: if in a dataset O and P are complementary, then they
are substitutes in the opposite dataset in which the instances of consumption of P are
switched with the instances of non-consumption of P (holding xed the consumption/non-
consumption of O). Duality is arguably the soul of statistical association, as it is evi-
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dently satised by all common measures of correlation and association. It is intrinsic to
the nature of association that inverting behaviour changes the sign of the association.
The conict in general is a little more subtle than in the simple example above. Even
for symmetric concepts of complementarity for which complementarity is always bidi-
rectional (i.e., if one good complements another then vice versa) the two properties do
not atly contradict each other. However, theorem 1 and its corollary 1 show that any
symmetric concept of complementarity that satises monotonicity and duality must be
also unresponsive, in the sense that the level of non-consumption p? on its own deter-
mines whether the goods are complements or substitutes, irrespective of the distribution
between single and joint consumption. This is a very undesirable feature, and for this
reason we interpret the result as one of conict between the the statistical association and
the revealed preference principles. Furthermore, a second impossibility result (theorem
2) shows that duality and monotonicity are in outright conict if it is also assumed that
the frontier between complementarity and independence is thin, as is the case for the
standard elasticity-based criteria.
We then look for ways out of the impossibility (Section 5). We rst show that correla-
tion is the only symmetric criterion of complementarity that satises both duality and a
modied monotonicity condition, which embodies only particular aspects of the revealed
preference principle.
Next, we examine monotonic criteria that satisfy modied notions of duality, based on
alternative interpretations of what constitutes the opposite of a given behaviour. One
criterion is economically intuitive if the numbers pOP , pO and pP are taken as expressing
the values of the respective options: O and P are complementary (resp., substitutes) if
pOP > pO + pP (resp., pOP < pO + pP ). This criterion satises a duality property based
on exchanging joint consumption with total single good consumption.
The third criterion for complementarity to be considered says that O and P are com-
plementary (resp., substitutes) if pOP > max fpO; pPg (resp., pOP < min fpO; pPg). This
criterion satises a notion of duality based on exchanging joint consumption with one
type of single good consumption. We consider these as the three main candidate criteria
of model-free stochastic complementarity.4
4As a matter of fact, while various commentators (including the authors) have di¤erent preferences
over these three criteria, and any of the three gets some support, none has been suggested outside of the
three.
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Having dened complementarity in these ways, in Section 6 we nally go back, with
some examples, to the question that is usually the starting point of the analysis: How
do tastes or cognitive variables a¤ect complementarity? For example, if choice behaviour
is at least in part guided by preferences, what aspect of preferences makes two good
complementary or substitutes? In order to answer such questions we need to postulate
specic models of the process leading to choice. We look at two models in particular. The
rst is the basic Luce (or multinomial logit) model of stochastic choice. The second is (a
particular version of) the more recent stochastic consideration set model of Manzini and
Mariotti [17] and Brady and Rehbeck [9]. We discover that in both cases the correlation
criterion on data reects novel supermodularity types of condition on preferences.
In the concluding discussion we argue the Hicksian complementarity criterion is ill-
suited for the type of data we are considering.
2 Related literature
Samuelson [21] contains an erudite discussion of the subtleties of the concept of comple-
mentarity, with an exhaustive review of the classical literature.
The work by Gentzkow [14] we have already mentioned pioneers the approach to
the zero price problem. He asks the question of whether the online and print versions
of a newspaper are complements or substitutes. The main di¢culty to be solved in
this case is that the observed correlation in consumption may partly reect correlated
unobservable tastes for the goods, rather than true complementarity: for instance, a
news junkie may consume both paper and online versions even when there is no true
complementarity, which in a model of (random) utility maximisation means a positive
di¤erence between the value of joint consumption and the sum of the values of single
good consumptions.5 Gentzkow nds su¢cient conditions under which correlation in
choice data is indicative of Hicksian complementarity, and analyses the identication
of complementarity (as opposed to taste correlation) in the data by using exogenous
variations in factors that do not interact with preferences. This requires the development
of an innovative econometric identication technique which, however, is meaningful only
5As Gentzkow shows, in the two good model this is equivalent to a positive compensated cross price
elasticity of demand.
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within the random utility model. Our approach, in contrast, is to investigate whether
complementarity or substitution can be identied in a model-free fashion. Our agents
may not even have a utility function.
It is a surprising fact that the full behavioural implications of the classical denitions of
complementarity and substitutability, based on cross price elasticities, have only recently
been uncovered, in two papers by Chambers, Echenique and Shmaya ([11] and [12]). The
key di¤erence between their work and ours is that their hypothetical data include obser-
vations of consumption decisions for di¤erent prices (as the classical denition requires),
whereas ours are based on consumption decisions alone.
A large literature exists in which supermodularity of a utility function gives, by de-
nition, a complementarity relationship between the goods, and likewise submodularity
is equivalent to substitutability (see for example Bikhchandani and Mamer [7], Gül and
Stachetti [16] for applications of submodularity and related notions of substitutability in
general equilibrium models with indivisibilities.6) These denitions are cardinal. Comple-
mentarity in the form of supermodularity is also the bread and butter of modern monotone
comparative static techniques as surveyed by Topkis [22]. Our approach di¤ers from this
line of work, in that our axiomatic analysis starts with the data, rather than with the
underlying preference.
3 Preliminaries
There are two goods, x and y. A datapoint is an ordered four-tuple p = (pxy; px; py; p?)
with pk 2 (0; 1) for k 2 fxy; x; y;?g and
P
k2fxy;x;y;?g pk = 1. The interpretation is that
pxy denotes the probability (or frequency) of joint consumption of x and y, px and py
denote the probabilities of consumption of x but not y and of y but not x, respectively,
and p? denotes the probability of consuming neither x nor y.
We consider the partitions of the set
T =

(a; b; c; d) 2 (0; 1)4 : a+ b+ c+ d = 1
	
in three regions: the complementarity region C, the substitution region S and the indepen-
dence region I. If p 2 C (resp. p 2 S, resp. p 2 I) we say that x and y are complements
6See Baldwin and Klemperer [3] for an innovative approach (based on tools from tropical geometry)
that yields complements/substitutes types of conditions for the existence of equlibria with discrete goods.
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(resp. substitutes, resp. independent) at p. We call any such partition a criterion.
Here are some examples of criteria:
Example 1 (correlation):
C =

(pxy; px; py; p?) 2 T :
pxy
pxy + py
> pxy + px

S =

(pxy; px; py; p?) 2 T :
pxy
pxy + py
< pxy + px

According to the correlation criterion a datapoint is in C (resp., S) if and only if the
information that one of the goods is consumed increases (resp., decreases) the probability
the other good is also consumed.
Example 2 (additivity)
C = f(pxy; px; py; p?) 2 T : pxy > px + pyg
S = f(pxy; px; py; p?) 2 T : pxy < px + pyg
The additivity criterion is natural whenever one thinks of the probabilities as express-
ing values (as is the case in the logit model). Then it says that x and y are complements
whenever the value of joint consumption is greater than the sums of the values of the
goods when consumed singly. This is in fact the notion of complementarity used in many
applications, e.g. the literature on bundling (e.g. Armstrong [2]).
Example 3 (maxmin)
C = f(pxy; px; py; p?) 2 T : pxy > max fpx; pygg
S = f(pxy; px; py; p?) 2 T : pxy < min fpx; pygg
The maxmin criterion ts, for instance, the situation in which one good is an acces-
sory and only the dominant single good consumption is relevant in comparison with
joint consumption to declare complementarity. To check whether steak and pepper are
complementary you may want to compare the probability of consumption of steak with
that of steak and pepper, rather than with that of pepper alone. Substitution is declared
symmetrically.
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Example 4 (supermodularity)
C = f(pxy; px; py; p?) 2 T : pxy + p? > px + pyg
S = f(pxy; px; py; p?) 2 T : pxy + p? < px + pyg
Here the goods are declared complementary if a supermodularity condition on p is sat-
ised (with p seen as a function dened on the set of consumption bundles fxy; x; y;?g).
Supermodularity-type conditions capture complementarity when imposed on an objective
function to be maximised (Topkis [22], Milgrom and Roberts [19], Milgrom and Shannon
[20]). Note that the condition is equivalent to pxy + p? > 12 .
For illustration, consider table 1, calculated on the basis of Gentzkows [14] data on
5-day readership of the online and print version of the Washington Post:
Read print Did not read print
Read online 0:137 0:043
Did not read online 0:447 0:373
Table 1: Washington Post, 5-day readership of online and print version (Gentzkow [14]).
In this case the above example criteria are in deep conict: the correlation and su-
permodularity criteria indicate that the two versions are complementary, the additivity
criterion indicates that they are substitutes, and the maximin criterion indicates that
they are independent. Therefore, in order to assess the di¤erent criteria, we propose
an axiomatic analysis, examining the properties that criteria should possess given the
interpretation.
4 Impossibilities
In this section we uncover the core conict between the association and the revealed
preference principle discussed in the introduction.
Symmetry:
1) If (a; b; c; d) 2 C then (a; c; b; d) 2 C.
2) If (a; b; c; d) 2 S then (a; c; b; d) 2 S.
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Symmetry says that exchanging the amounts of single good consumptions is immaterial
for the purpose of classifying goods into complementary or substitutes. Samuelson [21]
considers its symmetry as one of the two major improvements of the Slutsky-Hicks-Allen-
Schultz compensated denitions compared to the uncompensated one.
Note that the two symmetry conditions imply an analogous property for I: if (a; b; c; d) 2
I, then (a; c; b; d) 2 I. For if (a; c; b; d) 62 I, then one of the two conditions would yield
(a; b; c; d) 62 I.
As explained in the introduction, we view duality as the soul of all association-based
denitions of complementarity and substitution:
Duality
1) If (a; b; c; d) 2 C then (b; a; d; c) 2 S.
2) If (a; b; c; d) 2 S then (b; a; d; c) 2 C.
Suppose that you have two datapoints p and q. Suppose that, whether x is consumed
or not, y is consumed at q with the same frequency with which it is not consumed at p.
If a datapoint were presented in table form, as in the introduction, q would be obtained
from p by switching the rows. For example, q could be obtained when y is consumed
only in weekends while p is obtained when y is consumed only in weekdays (assuming
for simplicity that ys consumption pattern is the same whether x is consumed or not).
In this sense q expresses a behaviour that is the opposite of the behaviour at p. Then
duality says that x and y are complements at p only if they are substitutes at q, and
vice-versa.
Note that, as for Symmetry, the two duality conditions imply a third one concerning
the independence region, namely that if (a; b; c; d) 2 I, then (b; a; d; c) 2 I.
The revealed preference principle is formalised as follows:
Monotonicity
1) If (a; b; c; d) 2 C, (a0; b0; c0; d0) 2 T , a0  a, b  b0 and c  c0 then (a0; b0; c0; d0) 2 C.
2) If (a; b; c; d) 2 S, (a0; b0; c0; d0) 2 T , a  a0, b0  b and c0  c then (a0; b0; c0; d0) 2 S.
Monotonicity says that, if goods are complements, then an increase in joint consump-
tion without an increase in single consumption cannot transform them into substitutes or
render them independent, and vice-versa.
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There do exist criteria that satisfy Symmetry, Duality and Monotonicity: for example,
the supermodularity criterion above. However, this criterion is highly unsatisfactory,
because it declares the goods complementary at any datapoint for which p? > 12 , for all
possible values of pxy, px and py. This looks wrong on two counts. First, it is desirable
that no individual component of (a; b; c; d), should be decisive by itself to declare either
complementarity or substitutability: the criterion should also respond to variations in the
other components. Secondly, even granting the possibility of one component dictating the
criterion, it is hard to justify the fact that it is a high value of p? on its own to mandate
complementarity.
The following property captures a logically even weaker version of these ideas. Essen-
tially, it just excludes the (bizarre) claim that is implicit in a complementarity criterion
such as p? > 12 : these goods are clearly complementary: they are rarely consumed to-
gether. While it allows in principle p? to be decisive, a very high non-consumption level
should not by itself indicate complementarity.
Responsiveness: There exists  2 (0; 1) such that, for all d 2 ( ; 1), (a; b; c; d) 2 S for
some (a; b; c) 2 (0; 1)3.
For example, the correlation criterion satises Responsiveness. It is also satises Sym-
metry and Duality, but, as noted in the introduction, it is not monotonic. The additivity
criterion satises all properties except part (2) of Duality. The maxmin criterion fails
only Duality.
It turns out that all possible symmetric criteria that satisfy Duality and Monotonicity
must fail Responsiveness:
Theorem 1 There exists no criterion that satises Symmetry, Monotonicity, Duality and
Responsiveness.
Proof: We start by proving:
Claim: Let (C; I; S) be a criterion that satises Symmetry and Duality. If (a; b; c; d) 2 C
then (d; b; c; a) 2 C.
To prove the Claim, suppose (a; b; c; d) 2 C. By Symmetry (a; c; b; d) 2 C. By Duality
(c; a; d; b) 2 S. By Symmetry (c; d; a; b) 2 S. By Duality (d; c; b; a) 2 C. Finally, by
Symmetry (d; b; c; a) 2 C.
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Returning to the proof of the main result, suppose that a criterion (C; I; S) satises
Symmetry, Monotonicity, Duality and Responsiveness. By Duality and Responsiveness
there exists a p = (a; b; c; d) such that p 2 C. To see this, by Responsiveness there exists
 2 (0; 1) such that, for all d 2 ( ; 1), (a; b; c; d) 2 S for some (a; b; c) 2 (0; 1)3, and then
by (2) of Duality (b; a; d; c) 2 C.
Let  = minfa; b; c; dg, and note in particular that it must be d < 1  .
We will now show that for all q = (a0; b0; c0; d0) 2 T , if d0 > 1    then q 2 C. This
contradicts Responsiveness and thus proves the impossibility. Take such a q, and let
r = (d0; b0; c0; a0). Note that b0 <  (otherwise, if b0  , then d0 > 1   b0 and thus
b0 + d0 > 1), and similarly c0 < . Then d0 > 1    > a, b0 <   b and c0 <   c. By
Monotonicity, r 2 C and by the Claim above, we conclude that q 2 C.
Symmetry is not implied by the other three axioms. For example the criterion given
by C = f(a; b; c; d) : a > bg and S = f(a; b; c; d) : a < bg satises Duality, Monotonicity
and Responsiveness but not Symmetry. This - together with the other examples given
previously - shows that the impossibility result of theorem 1 is tight.
To clarify the role played by Symmetry in the impossibility, consider the following
strengthening of Duality.
Duality*
1) If (a; b; c; d) 2 C then (b; a; d; c) 2 S and (c; d; a; b) 2 S.
2) If (a; b; c; d) 2 S then (b; a; d; c) 2 C and (c; d; a; b) 2 C.
Duality* adds to Duality the requirement that switching columns in a table leads to
the same e¤ect as switching rows. In the presence of Symmetry, Duality and Duality* are
equivalent. However Duality* alone does not imply Symmetry. For example the criterion
dened by C = f(a; b; c; d) : b > a and c > dg and S = f(a; b; c; d) : b < a and c < dg sat-
ises Duality* but fails Symmetry: (0:3; 0:31; 0:2; 0:19) 2 C yet (0:3; 0:2; 0:31; 0:19) 2 I.
Note that this criterion also fails Monotonicity. This observation motivates the following
results.
Lemma 1 If a criterion satises Duality* and Monotonicity, then it satises Symmetry.
Proof: Suppose that a criterion (C; I; S) satisfy Duality* and Monotonicity but fails
Symmetry. We consider four cases.
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Case 1: (a; b; c; d) 2 C but (a; c; b; d) 2 S. By Duality* (b; a; d; c) 2 S and (c; a; d; b) 2
C. By Monotonicity c > b. Applying Duality* to the rst two datapoints we get
(c; d; a; b) 2 S and (b; d; a; c) 2 C, and then by Monotonicity b > c, a contradiction.
Case 2: (a; b; c; d) 2 C but (a; c; b; d) 2 I. By Duality* (b; a; d; c) 2 S and (c; a; d; b) 2
I. By Monotonicity c > b. Applying Duality* to the rst two datapoints we get
(c; d; a; b) 2 S and (b; d; a; c) 2 I, and then by Monotonicity b > c, a contradiction.
Cases 3 and 4 where (a; b; c; d) 2 S and (a; c; b; d) 62 S are similar.
Hence,
Corollary 1 There exists no criterion that satises Duality*, Monotonicity and Respon-
siveness.
Finally, the clash between association and monotonicity properties can also be ob-
served from a di¤erent angle. Consider:
I Monotonicity
1) If (a; b; c; d) 2 I, (a0; b0; c0; d0) 2 T , and a0  a, b0  b and c0  c, with at least one
inequality strict, then (a0; b0; c0; d0) 2 C.
2) If (a; b; c; d) 2 I, (a0; b0; c0; d0) 2 T , and a0  a, b0  b and c0  c, with at least one
inequality strict, then (a0; b0; c0; d0) 2 S.
Loosely, I Monotonicity says that, if the goods are independent, then increasing joint
consumption while decreasing single good consumption makes them complementary. This
monotonicity property incorporates a responsiveness requirement: essentially, it implies
that the Independence area is thin, as is the case for all standard denitions of comple-
mentarity/substitutability.
Theorem 2 There exists no criterion that satises Symmetry, I Monotonicity, and Du-
ality.
Proof: Suppose that (C; I; S) satises the axioms. Take p = (a; a; b; b) with b > a. It
cannot be (a; a; b; b) 2 S, for then by Duality (a; a; b; b) 2 C, a contradiction. Similarly, it
cannot be (a; a; b; b) 2 C. Then (a; a; b; b) 2 I. By Symmetry, (a; b; a; b) 2 I. By Duality
(b; a; b; a) 2 I. But this contradicts I Monotonicity.
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5 Possibilities
We now turn our attention to resolutions of the conicts. We analyse three plausible
criteria, correlation, additivity and maxmin. Correlation is obtained by preserving Duality
and appropriately modifying the monotonicity properties. For the other two criteria, we
retain instead the monotonicity properties but vary the notion of duality. A duality
operation produces the opposite behaviour to the one to which the operation is applied.
A duality property in our context asserts, loosely, that if a datapoint is classied in a
certain way, then its dual is classied in the opposite way. This is an intuitive requirement
but, as we will see, there are other reasonable ways to interpret the concept of opposite
behaviour, hence other reasonable versions of duality.
5.1 Correlation
Recall that according to the correlation criterion two goods are complements (substitutes)
if their consumption is positively (negatively) correlated. While, as we have seen, the
criterion fails Monotonicity, it satises a di¤erent monotonicity condition. Let us write,
for any vector q 2 <4++,
q =
1P
qi
q
so that q 2 T .
Scale Monotonicity
1) If (a; b; c; d) 2 C and m  n > 0, then (ma; nb; c; d) 2 C.
2) If (a; b; c; d) 2 S and n  m > 0, then (ma; nb; c; d) 2 S.
3) If (a; b; c; d) 2 I, then (ma; nb; c; d) 2 I (2 C, 2 S) if m = n (> n, < n):
Suppose that the total time spent reading the online version (alone or together with
the print version) changes, but the time spent reading the online version alone decreases
(resp., increases) as a proportion of the time spent reading both versions. Suppose also
that the time left is allocated exactly in the same proportion as before between reading the
print version and not reading either version. Parts (1) and (2) of Scale Monotonicity say
that if the initial consumption pattern indicated complementarity (resp., substitutability),
then the new consumption pattern should also indicate complementarity (resp., substi-
tutability). Part (3) of the axioms states a similar idea based on I-Monotonicity.
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Theorem 3 A criterion satises Symmetry, Duality and Scale Monotonicity if and only
if it is the correlation criterion.
Proof: That the three axioms are necessarily satised by the correlation denition is
trivial. Suppose that a criterion (C; I; S) satises the three axioms. Begin by noting that
(pxy; px; py; p?) 2 C ,
pxy
pxy + py
> pxy + px
, pxy (1  pxy   px   py) > pxpy
, pxyp? > pxpy
and similarly (pxy; px; py; p?) 2 S , pxyp? < pxpy. Then, since C, I and S form a
partition, the result follows from the following three claims.
Claim 1: C  f(a; b; c; d) 2 T : ad > bcg. Take (a; b; c; d) 2 C and suppose towards a
contradiction that ad  bc: It follows that minfa; dg  maxfb; cg. Symmetry and Duality
imply that w.l.o.g. we can assume d  a and b  c so that d  c.
We will show that b < a. First note that (d; c; b; a) 2 C by Symmetry and Duality. By
Scale Monotonicity (recall d  c) ( c
d
d; d
c
c; b; a) = (c; d; b; a) 2 C. Now Using Symmetry
and Duality again we get (a; b; d; c) 2 C. Duality gives (b; a; c; d) 2 S. Now if b  a,
applying Scale Monotonicity (a
b
b; b
a
a; c; d) = (a; b; c; d) 2 S, a contradiction. Hence b < a
as we wanted to show.
We have (a; ad
bc
b; c; d) = (a; ad
c
; c; d) 2 C by Scale Monotonicity since ad
bc
 1. By Sym-
metry and Duality (d; ad
c
; c; a) 2 C. Applying Scale Monotonicity again, ( c
d
d; c
d
ad
c
; c; a) =
(c; a; c; a) 2 C. Apply Symmetry and Duality again and we get (a; c; a; c) 2 C. By
SM ( b
a
a; d
c
c; a; c) = (b; d; a; c) 2 C since ad  bc gives d
c
 b
a
. Finally this implies, by
Symmetry and Duality, that (a; b; c; d) 2 S, contradiction.
Claim 2: S  fad < bcg. Take (a; b; c; d) 2 C and suppose towards a contradiction
that ad  bc: It follows that minfb; cg  maxfa; dg. Symmetry and Duality say that
w.l.o.g. we can assume a  d and c  b so that c  d.
We will show that a < b. First note that (d; c; b; a) 2 S by Symmetry and Duality. By
Scale Monotonicity (recall c  d) ( c
d
d; d
c
c; b; a) = (c; d; b; a) 2 S. Now Using Symmetry
and Duality again we get (a; b; d; c) 2 S. Duality gives (b; a; c; d) 2 C. Now if a  b,
applying Scale Monotonicity (a
b
b; b
a
a; c; d) = (a; b; c; d) 2 C, a contradiction. Hence a < b
as we wanted to show.
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We have (a; ad
bc
b; c; d) = (a; ad
c
; c; d) 2 S by Scale Monotonicity since ad
bc
 1. By Sym-
metry and Duality (d; ad
c
; c; a) 2 S. Applying Scale Monotonicity again, ( c
d
d; c
d
ad
c
; c; a) =
(c; a; c; a) 2 S. Apply Symmetry* and Symmetry to get (a; c; a; c) 2 S. By Scale
Monotonicity ( b
a
a; d
c
c; a; c) = (b; d; a; c) 2 S since ad  bc gives d
c
 b
a
. Finally this
implies, by Symmetry and Duality, that (a; b; c; d) 2 C, contradiction.
Claim 3: I  fad = bcg. Take (a; b; c; d) 2 I and suppose towards a contradiction that
ad < bc. Then set w.l.o.g. d < c and consequently, using part (3) of Scale Monotonicity in
an exact adaptation of Claim 1, a > b. The rest of the argument mirrors that in Claim 1.
Similarly follow, with the obvious necessary modications, the proof of Claim 2 if ad > bc.
5.2 Additivity
As noted before, the additivity criterion given in Example 2 is symmetric and monotonic.
It also satises the notion of duality based on the operation illustrated below:
y  y
x a c
 x b d
!
y  y
x b+ c a
 
c
b+c

 x a
 
b
b+c

d
.
The operation consists of exchanging Total single good consumption with Joint con-
sumption (with the joint consumption allocated to the two goods in proportion to the
amounts that were consumed singly).
(T,J)-Duality For  = b
b+c
:
1) If (a; b; c; d) 2 C, then (b+ c; a; (1  ) a; d) 2 S .
2) If (a; b; c; d) 2 S, then (b+ c; a; (1  ) a; d) 2 C.
(T,J)-Duality says that the duality operation above transforms complementarity into sub-
stitution and viceversa. For example, if online and print newspapers are complements for
a consumer who reads both versions two thirds of the time and a single version (either
print or online) one fourth of the time, then they must be substitutes for a consumer who
reads both versions one fourth of the time and the single versions two thirds of the time.
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Note that if (a0; b0; c0; d0) is a (T,J)-dual to (a; b; c; d) (in the sense that a0 = b + c,
b0 = ab=(b + c), c0 = ac=(b + c) and d0 = d), then (a; b; c; d) is dual to (a0; b0; c0; d0)
in the same way as well. Consequently, (T,J)-Duality implies: if (a; b; c; d) 2 I, then 
a+ b; ab
a+b
; ac
a+b
; d

2 I:
Theorem 4 A criterion satises Monotonicity, I Monotonicity and (T,J)-Duality if
and only if it is the additivity criterion.
Proof. It is straightforward to show that the additivity criterion satises the three
axioms. Suppose that (C; I; S) satises the three axioms. The result follows from the
following three claims.
Claim 1: C  f(a; b; c; d) 2 T : a > b+ cg.
Suppose towards a contradiction that (a; b; c; d) 2 C and a  b+ c. By (T,J)-Duality,
(b+ c; ab=(b+ c); ac=(b+ c); d) 2 S. Since a= (b+ c)  1 this contradicts Monotonicity.
Claim 2: S  f(a; b; c; d) 2 T : a < b+ cg.
The proof is symmetric to that of Claim 1.
Claim 3: I  f(a; b; c; d) 2 T : a = b+ cg.
Suppose that (a; b; c; d) 2 I but a < b+c. (T,J)-Duality yields (b+c; ab=(b+c); ac=(b+
c); d) 2 I, which contradicts I-Monotonicity. Similarly if a > b+ c.
5.3 Maxmin
The Maxmin criterion is a monotonic criterion that di¤ers structurally from the other two
because it has a thick independence region (so that it will not satisfy I Monotonicity).
It expresses yet a di¤erent notion of duality, based on the operation illustrated below:
y  y
x a c
 x b d
!
y  y
x b c
 x a d
Here, the behaviour opposite to a given one is dened by exchanging joint consumption
with only one of the single good consumptions. Ideally, we would like to impose a property
of the following type. Suppose that online and print newspapers are complements for a
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consumer who, when he reads the print version, also reads the online version % of
the time; then, they must be substitutes for a consumer who, when he reads the print
version, also reads the online version (1  )% of the time (and analogously starting
from substitutability). It is a consequence of our characterisation below that this type
of duality together with Symmetry and Monotonicity leads to another impossibility. So
we use a weakened version of the property, which settles for merely switching out of the
initial region after the duality operation.
(S,J)-Duality
1) If (a; b; c; d) 2 C then (b; a; c; d) =2 C and (c; b; a; d) =2 C.
2) If (a; b; c; d) 2 S then (b; a; c; d) =2 S and (c; b; a; d) =2 S.
3) If (a; b; c; d) 2 I and a 6= b (resp. a 6= c) then (b; a; c; d) =2 I (resp. (c; b; a; d) =2 I).
Theorem 5 A criterion (C; I; S) satises Symmetry, (S,J)-Duality and Monotonicity if
and only if is the maxmin criterion.
Proof: Necessity is easily checked. In the other direction, suppose that (C; I; S) satises
these three axioms axioms. We will rst show that C  f(a; b; c; d) : a > b; cg. Sup-
pose, towards a contradiction, that (a; b; c; d) 2 C but a  maxfb; cg. By (S,J)-Duality
(b; a; c; d) 62 C and (c; b; a; d) 62 C, and this contradicts Monotonicity. Hence a > b; c.
Similarly if (a; b; c; d) 2 S but a  minfb; cg, then (S,J)-Duality yields (b; a; c; d) 62 S and
(c; b; a; d) 62 S, again contradicting Monotonicity. Hence S  f(a; b; c; d) : a < b; cg.
It remains to show that I  fminfb; cg  a  maxfb; cgg and the proof will follow
the fact that (C; I; S) is a partition: To this end take some (a; b; c; d) 2 I. There are three
cases to consider regarding where the dual datapoint (b; a; c; d) lies.
Case 1: (b; a; c; d) 2 I. Then by (S,J)-Duality (part 3), a = b and thereforeminfb; cg 
a  maxfb; cg.
Case 2: (b; a; c; d) 2 S. By Monotonicity we must have a > b, giving a  minfb; cg.
By Symmetry on the other hand, (a; c; b; d) 2 I. By (S,J)-Duality applied to (b; a; c; d),
(c; a; b; d) 62 S. Now either (c; a; b; d) 2 I, in which case a = c by (S,J)-Duality (part
3), or (c; a; b; d) 2 C, in which case c > a by Monotonicity. Hence a  c and therefore
a  maxfb; cg.
Case 3: (b; a; c; d) 2 C. By Monotonicity b > a and therefore a  maxfb; cg. By
Symmetry (a; c; b; d) 2 I. By (S,J)-Duality (c; a; b; d) 62 C. Either (c; a; b; d) 2 I, in
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which case a = c by (S,J)-Duality (part 3), or (c; a; b; d) 2 S, in which case c < a by
Monotonicity. Hence a  c and therefore a  minfb; cg.
6 From behaviour to psychology: two examples with
the correlation criterion
So far we have followed a rigorously behavioural approach, eschewing any hypothesis on
the choice process that generates the data. Sometimes, though, one may entertain a
hypothesis on the decision process that has generated the data. Even so, the previous
analysis can be useful. We can ask what the psychological primitives must look like in a
model for behavioural complementarity to be observed. In this way, we can obtain non-
obvious complementarity conditions expressed, e.g. in terms of preferences, but justied
by purely behavioural properties.
To perform this exercise we need to postulate some decision models: we study two
simple polar representatives. The rst is the logit model, in which preferences are random
and applied to a deterministic set. The second model is a simplication of the stochastic
choice model in Manzini andMariotti [17] and Brady and Rehbeck [9], in which preferences
are deterministic but there is randomness in the subset of alternatives that are actively
considered by the agent. For reasons of space, we perform the analysis only for the
correlation criterion, which is the case yielding the most intriguing answers. As we shall
see, in both polar cases this criterion implies supermodularity-style conditions on the
psychological primitives.
In the logit model, we assume that each bundle  2 fxy; x; y;?g has a systematic
utility u : fxy; x; y;?g ! R++, and that  is chosen with logit probability, namely
p
(u;)
logit () =
exp
 
u

P
2fxy;x;y;?g exp
 
u

 (1)
where  > 0 is a scaling factor (measuring the variance of the underlying Gumbel er-
rors, see McFadden [18]). In this specication, purely random behaviour (i.e. uniform
distribution on fxy; x; y;?g) is obtained in the limit as  tends to innity and rational
deterministic behaviour is obtained for  = 0.
In the stochastic consideration set model the agent has a preference relation  on
fxy; x; yg. The agent considers each nonempty bundle  with a probability  2 (0; 1)
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independent of . The agent chooses a bundle by maximising  on the set of bundles
that he considers. In the event that the agent does not consider any bundle, the agent
picks the empty bundle. Note that unlike in the multinomial logit case we are only given
ordinal preference information.7 Therefore  is chosen with probability
p(;)cons () =
(
 (1  )() if  2 fxy; x; yg
(1  )3 if  = ?
(2)
where
 () = jf 2 fxy; x; yg :   gj:
Then in the logit model the correlation criterion yields:
p
(u;)
logit 2 C
,
euxy=
euxy= + eux= + euy= + eu?=
euxy= + eux=
euxy= + eux= + euy= + eu?=
>
euxy= + euy=
euxy= + eux= + euy= + eu?=
, euxy=eu?= > eux=euy=
, uxy + u? > ux + uy
and similarly
p
(u;)
logit 2 S , uxy + u? < ux + uy
That is:
 in the two-good logit model x and y are complementary according to the correlation
criterion if and only if the systematic utility u is strictly supermodular on , and
substitutes if and only if u is strictly submodular.
Remarkably, this holds independently of the scaling factor . As we shall see, this scale
independence property is lost as soon as we consider a multi-good case. Note also that
this complementarity condition is not invariant to monotonic transformations of utility.
7In Manzini and Mariotti [17] and Brady and Rehbeck [9] the consideration coe¢cients depend, re-
spectively, on the individual alternatives and on the menu.
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Turning to the stochastic consideration set model, simple calculations show the fol-
lowing:8 provided that  is greater than a threshold value  2 (0; 1),
p(;)cons 2 S , x  y  xy or y  x  xy
p(;)cons 2 C for any other preference ordering
That is:
 In the two good stochastic consideration set model and for  su¢ciently high, x
and y are complementary according to the correlation criterion if and only if joint
consumption is not at the bottom of the preference ordering, and they are substitutes
otherwise.
Since the model uses ordinal information on preferences, unlike in the logit case, we
have obtained a purely ordinal preference condition for complementarity/substitutability.
6.1 The multi-good case
The two-good case is in some respects very specic, as some relevant general features of the
complementarity conditions (notably the dependence on the psychological parameters)
cannot be understood from it. We now consider an extension of the correlation criterion to
the multi-good case. We will show that complementarity in both models can be expressed
as a supermodularity condition on preferences, one cardinal an the other ordinal.
Let X = fx; y; :::g be a nite set of goods, and let  be the power set of X. We are
interested as usual in the complementarity between x and y. A datapoint is a probability
distribution p on , with p () denoting the probability of bundle  2 . Dene the
8For example, if x  y  xy, then x and y are complementary with the correlation criterion i¤
(1  )
2

(1  )
2
+ 
> (1  )
2
+ (1  )
Thus it is easy to check that there exists a unique  2 (0; 1) such that x and y are complementary for
 < , substitutes for  >  and independent for  = .
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following sets:
XY = f 2  : x 2 ; y 2 g
X Y = f 2  : x =2 ; y =2 g
XY = f 2  : x =2 ; y 2 g
X Y = f 2  : x 2 ; y =2 g
We study the following generalised correlation criterion:
p 2 C ,
P
2XY p ()P
2XY [X Y p ()
>
X
2XY [ XY
p ()
,
X
2XY
p ()
 
1 
X
2XY
p () 
X
2 XY
p () 
X
2X Y
p ()
!
>
 X
2X Y
p ()
X
2 XY
p ()
!
,
X
2XY
p ()
X
2 X Y
p () >
X
2X Y
p ()
X
2 XY
p ()
and similarly
p 2 S ,
X
2XY
p ()
X
2 X Y
p () <
X
2X Y
p ()
X
2 XY
p ()
In this denition, joint consumption of x and y is implicitly interpreted as meaning all
instances of bundles where both x and y are consumed, and single consumption of x
(resp., y) is interpreted as all instances of bundles where x (resp., y) is consumed but
not y (resp., x). Obviously, other interpretations are possible. It could be the case, for
example, that x is consumed together with z but not y because x is complementary to z
but y is not. In this case the consumption of x without y would not express in a clean
way the fact that x and y are substitutes. For example, you may consume 50% of the
time co¤ee and milk and 50% of the time tea and milk, so that according to the criteria
we have studied co¤ee would be independent from milk, while in an intuitive sense they
are complementary. Here we ignore for simplicity this problem.9
9As Samuleson [21] discusses, similar conceptual problems in the multi-good case arise also for the
standard elasticity-based denitions. If milk is complementary to co¤ee but it is even more complementary
to tea, a rise in the price of co¤ee, leading to a substitution of tea for co¤ee, will also generate an increase
in the consumption of milk, making milk look like a substitute of co¤ee.
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6.1.1 Logit
In the logit model (1) generalises to
p
(u;)
logit () =
exp
 
u

P
2 exp
 
u

 for  2 
with u : ! R++, so that with the correlation criterion we have
p
(u;)
logit 2 C ,
X
2XY;2 X Y
exp
u


exp
u


>
X
2 XY;2X Y
exp
u


exp
u


p
(u;)
logit 2 S ,
X
2XY;2 X Y
exp
u


exp
u


<
X
2 XY;2X Y
exp
u


exp
u


Unlike in the two-good case, the scaling factor  now becomes important to assess com-
plementarity. We study the limiting behaviour of the complementarity conditions for 
tending to zero, which captures the case of small errors with respect to utility maximisa-
tion.10
Theorem 6 In the limit for ! 0, according to the correlation criterion
p
(u;)
logit 2 C , max
2XY;2 X Y
(u + u ) > max
2 XY;2X Y
(u + u )
p
(u;)
logit 2 S , max
2XY;2 X Y
(u + u ) < max
2 XY;2X Y
(u + u )
10In the case of large errors (behaviour is almost purely random) it is easy to see that the goods are
always approximately independent according to the correlation criterion:
lim
!1
0
@ X
2XY;2 X Y
exp
u


exp
u

1A = jXY j  j X Y j
= 2n 2  2n 2
= j XY j  jX Y j
= lim
!1
0
@ X
2 XY;2X Y
exp
u


exp
u

1A
so that neither the complementarity nor the substitutability condition can hold in the limit.
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Proof : Note rst that, for all  > 0,X
2XY;2 X Y
exp
u


exp
u


>
X
2 XY;2X Y
exp
u


exp
u


,
 ln
0
@ X
2XY;2 X Y
exp
u


exp
u

1A >  ln
0
@ X
2 XY;2X Y
exp
u


exp
u

1A
Next, dene
k () = max
2 XY;2X Y
u + u

Then we have:
lim
!0
0
@ ln
0
@ X
2 XY;2X Y
exp
u


exp
u

1A
1
A
= lim
!0
0
@ ln
0
@ X
2 XY;2X Y
exp

u + u


exp k ()
exp k ()
1
A
1
A
= lim
!0
0
@k () +  ln X
2 XY;2X Y
exp

u + u

  k ()
1A
= max
2 XY;2X Y
(u + u ) + lim
!0
0
@ ln X
2 XY;2X Y
exp

u + u

  k ()
1A
= max
2 XY;2X Y
(u + u )
To see that the last equality holds, note that each term in the summation is of the
form exp
 
A


, where A  0, and thus is either constant and equal to one or tends to zero
as  tends to zero. Moreover, at least one term is equal to one, so that the logarithm of
the sum remains nite in the limit.
An analogous calculation yields
lim
!0
0
@ ln
0
@ X
2XY;2 X Y
exp
u


exp
u

1A
1
A = max
2XY;2 X Y
(u + u )
from which the result follows.
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This result generalises the supermodularity condition we found in the two-good case.
In the multi-good case the highest utility elements are taken as representatives of the
various classes to be used in the two-good supermodularity formula. This role of the max
operator in the formula is interesting and not obvious a priori.
6.1.2 Consideration sets
Turning to the stochastic consideration set model, the probability of choosing bundle
 2  is dened as
p(;)cons () =
(
 (1  )() if  2 n?
(1  )jn?j if  = ?
(3)
where  is dened on n? and for all  2 n?
 () = j f 2 n? :   g j
Therefore with the correlation criterion, after simplifying:
p(;)cons 2 C ,
P
2XY (1  )
()P
2XY [X Y  (1  )
()
>
X
2XY [ XY
(1  )()
p(;)cons 2 S ,
P
2XY (1  )
()P
2XY [X Y  (1  )
()
<
X
2XY [ XY
(1  )()
We study the limiting case for  tending to one: this expresses small deviations from
the rationality case in which all alternatives are considered.
For  2 n?, dene the function u given by
u () =   () ,
which is a representation of the preference .
Theorem 7 In the limit for ! 1, according to the correlation criterion
p(;)cons 2 C , max
2XY;02 X Y
(u () + u (
0)) > max
2X Y ;02 XY
(u () + u (
0))
p(;)cons 2 S , max
2XY;02 X Y
(u () + u (
0)) < max
2X Y ;02 XY
(u () + u (
0))
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Proof : Fixing the preference , let  denote the best bundle. Note that all terms
 (1  )() tend to zero as ! 1 except the one corresponding to  (since () = 0).
We consider four cases, depending on whether  is in XY , XY , X Y or X Y .
Simple calculations11 show that the complementarity condition can be written asX
2XY
p () >
P
2X Y p ()
P
2 XY p ()P
2 X Y p ()
(4)
Suppose  2 XY . The LHS in (4) tends to one as  ! 1 (all terms in the sum tend to
zero except p ()). In the RHS all terms in the sums tend to zero, so that the limit of
the RHS depends on a comparison between the minimum powers of (1  ) that appear
in the numerator and in the the denominator, respectively. More precisely, the RHS can
be written asP
2X Y ;02 XY  (1  )
()  (1  )(
0)P
2 X Y n?  (1  )
() + (1  )jn?j
=
2
P
2X Y ;02 XY (1  )
()+(0)

P
2 X Y n? (1  )
() + (1  )jn?j
So, given that jn?j >  () for all  2 n?, if
min
2X Y ;02 XY
( () +  (0)) > min
2 X Y n?
 ()
then the RHS tends to zero and therefore the complementarity condition holds in the
limit, whereas if the reverse inequality holds then the RHS tends to innity and the goods
are substitutes for  large enough. In summary:
11To see this observe the following:P
2XY p ()P
2XY [X Y p ()
>
X
2XY [ XY
p (),
X
2XY
p () >
X
2XY [X Y
p ()
X
2XY [ XY
p () =
=
X
2XY
(p ())
2
+
X
2XY
p ()
X
2 XY
p () +
X
2X Y
p ()
X
2XY
p () +
X
2X Y
p ()
X
2 XY
p ()
,
X
2XY
p ()
0
@1  X
2XY
p () 
X
2 XY
p () 
X
2X Y
p ()
1
A > X
2X Y
p ()
X
2 XY
p ()
,
X
2XY
p ()
X
2 X Y
p () >
X
2X Y
p ()
X
2 XY
p ()
,
X
2XY
p () >
P
2X Y p ()
P
2 XY p ()P
2 X Y p ()
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Fact 1: Let  2 XY . Then, for  ! 1, p(;)cons 2 C (2 S) according to the correlation
criterion if there are strictly fewer (strictly more) than min2X Y ;02 XY ( () +  (
0))
bundles that are preferred to the best bundle in X Y .
A similar analysis solves the other cases:
Fact 2: Let  2 X Y . Then, for  ! 1, p(;)cons 2 C (2 S) according to the correlation
criterion if there are strictly fewer (strictly more) than min2X Y ;02 XY ( () +  (
0))
bundles that are preferred to the best bundle in XY .
Fact 3: Let  2 XY . Then, for  ! 1, p(;)cons 2 C (2 S) according to the correlation
criterion if there are strictly fewer (strictly more) than min2XY;02 X Y ( () +  (
0))
bundles that are preferred to the best bundle in X Y .
Fact 4: Let  2 XY . Then, for  ! 1, p(;)cons 2 C (2 S) according to the correlation
criterion if there are strictly fewer (strictly more) than min2XY;02 X Y ( () +  (
0))
bundles that are preferred to the best bundle in XY .
Now we can summarise these facts into a single statement by noting that, by denition,
if R 2

XY; XY; X Y ;X Y
	
is such that  2 R, then
min
2R
 () = 0
Therefore by inspection of the four conditions we can conclude that, in the limit for
! 1, according to the correlation criterion
p(;)cons 2 C , min
2XY;02 X Y
( () +  (0)) < min
2X Y ;02 XY
( () +  (0))
p(;)cons 2 S , min
2XY;02 X Y
( () +  (0)) > min
2X Y ;02 XY
( () +  (0))
which proves the result.
Strikingly, the condition in the statement is an exact ordinal analog of the condition
obtained for the rationality limit of the logit case, in which the utility of a bundle  is
measured by (the opposite of) the number of bundles better than . One way of under-
standing this analogy is to think that both models are special cases of the RUM family,
and that both models are based on an underlying preference. When the parameters of
these models converge to rationality, the deterministic preference e¤ect (as opposed to
the stochastic e¤ect) dominates. The correlation denition of complementarity captures
the complementarity information contained in these unbiased preference. However, in
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the multinomial logit case, preference is cardinal, while in the mood model preference is
ordinal: the numerical analogy between the conditions of the two models holds for one
utility representation of  but it may not hold for other, ordinally equivalent, represen-
tations.
6.2 Do the results support the correlation criterion?
We have shown that, in both of the models we have examined, identifying complementarity
with correlation is equivalent, in terms of primitives, to identifying complementarity with
a special form of supermodularity of the utility function. Because supermodularity is a
natural and accepted criterion for complementarity when expressed in terms of utility,
this might be taken as a validation of the correlation criterion. But our ndings also have
an alternative interpretation. They could be taken as an indication that, for the case of
random choice over bundles, supermodularity in utility over bundles is in itself a poor or
at least insu¢cient descriptor of complementarity. One reason for this interpretation in,
for example, the logit model is the following. The cross-partial of utility (uxy   ux)  
(uy   u?) may be positive while at the same time u? > uxy. In this case, complementarity
in the data must be driven by the lack of joint consumption (that is, p? is high) rather
than by joint consumption, and an increase in joint consumption can cause a reversion
to substitutability, which is unintuitive. Consider again the data in table 1. There, the
proportion of people who read both versions is only about one third of the proportion of
people that did not read either version, and single good consumption is much higher. The
positive correlation is mostly driven by non-readers: should we really be forced to say
that the versions are complementary because of the lack of joint consumption - with the
correlation possibly lost if joint consumption increases? This would be a violation of the
revealed preference principle discussed in the Introduction. The additivity criterion picks
this up and declares the goods substitutes rather than complements. Also, a positive
cross-partial of utility is compatible with uxy < max fux; uyg. Then once again positive
correlation can only be driven by a high proportion of non-consumers. In the table, the
proportion of people who read both versions is less than one third of the proportion of
people that read only the print version. The maxmin criterion picks this up by failing to
declare complementarity.
In sum, even when preferences govern behaviour (an assumption we have sought to
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eschew in our general treatment), it seems that while some form of statistical association
in consumption may be a natural ingredient of complementarity, statistical association per
se ignores some revealed preference information that is contained in the data and that
may be relevant to assess complementarity. For example, guns and bullets can be safely
considered complements, but in many countries people who own a gun are relatively rare:
so p? is high and px and py are very low (lower than joint consumption) and only account,
say, for the collectors of either of the single items. Suppose that after an increase in crime
we observe a massive increase in demand for guns by the joint consumers who worry about
personal safety, with a corresponding increase in the consumption of bullets, whereas the
collectors demand, which is unrelated to self-defense motives, stays unchanged. We
should interpret this shift as an increase in joint revealed preference for both guns and
bullets, and thus conrm our evaluation of guns and bullets as complements. But, as
we have seen, this cannot be guaranteed by the correlation criterion. This criterion
treats the shift analogously to a shift from observing few cases of smokers with lung
cancers to observing many such cases, with the frequencies of smokers with no cancer
and of non-smokers with cancers unchanged. From a purely statistical point of view this
may or may not be evidence of increased correlation, because both the prior probability
and the posterior probability of getting cancer conditional on smoking increase with the
shift. But an increase in joint gun/bullet consumption relative to only gun or only bullet
consumption is an act of choice that reveals a relative preference shift in favour of joint
consumption that is not meaningful in the clinical example: there cannot be any act of
choice that reveals a preference for smoking and getting cancer over just smoking.12
7 Concluding remarks
Complementarity in general is such a central concept in Economics that its study hardly
needs to be motivated. Complementarity has deeply engaged at the theoretical level some
12We should also note that the logit model, viewed as an additive RUM of the form u (b) = b + "b
(with b 2 fxy; x; y;?g, b the deterministic component of utility and "b the Gumbel distributed error
term) assumes zero correlation in the error terms. Adding some correlation to the error terms would
break the link between supermodularity in utility and the correlation criterion (details available from the
authors). Our point, however, is that even when supermodularity in utility is equivalent to correlation
in consumption, it is still possible that neither is a good criterion of complementarity.
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of the giants of the profession (see the historical overview in Samuelson [21]). Knowing
whether goods are complements or substitutes (or neither) is of major practical impor-
tance in disparate areas: for example, suppliers must have information about complemen-
tarity when introducing new products or when pricing existing products; so do regulators
to evaluate the competitiveness of a market; businesses may be reluctant to change a
practice because of its complementarity with another; and so on. Finally, the concept
of complementarity can be imaginatively applied in non-obvious contexts: for example,
Becker and Murphy [4] introduced the idea of assimilating the theory of advertising into
the theory of complementarity.
While statistical association is intuitively part of what it means for goods to go to-
gether (and sheer correlation in consumption or usage data is often taken as a behavioural
indicator of complementarity), we have shown that, in general, criteria for complementar-
ity based on statistical association alone conict with a basic monotonicity requirement
that captures the revealed preference aspect of complementarity. Our axiomatic analy-
sis suggests that if monotonicity is considered primarily important, then di¤erent criteria
(additivity and maxmin) may be preferable.
We have illustrated that the theoretical distinction between criteria is also relevant in
practice, since correlation, additivity and maxmin give strongly contrasting indications
using the data found in a leading application (Gentzkow [14]).
7.1 True complementarity vs. taste correlation
One criticism that could be made of our approach runs along the following lines.13 Suppose
that we observe a daily series of online/print news consumptions for an individual at
xed prices. Then each of our denitions will declare whether or not the two versions are
complements or substitutes. A denition of complementarity based on random utility,
on the other hand, will distinguish between the case in which the individual derives
more utility from joint consumption than from the sum of the utilities of single-version
consumption (true complementarity), and the case in which whenever the individual
wakes up in a mood for reading online news he is also likely to be in the mood for reading
the print version - he may simply wake up sometimes in the mood for news and some
other times not in the mood for news, independently of the form in which they come
13We thank Matthew Gentzkow for raising this important issue.
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(correlation in taste). Now, we could hold the choices constant and vary whether or not
they indicate true complementarity by changing the correlation in taste, whereas our
denitions will fail to record these changes. But the key point to understand here is that
the kind of complementarity we are trying to capture with our denitions is a related but
separate concept from the random utility based concept of complementarity. The latter
concept is tied to a specic assumption on the process that drives behaviour. But one
could make di¤erent assumptions. Suppose for example that behaviour was driven instead
by random consideration set mechanisms of the type discussed in section 6. Then we
should separate true complementarity from correlation in consideration rather than from
correlation in taste, as our individuals mood is now expressed by a shock in consideration
and not by a shock in taste: he wakes up sometimes considering both types of news media
and sometimes not considering either, while always deriving utility from either in the same
way. This leads to a di¤erent identication problem and likely to a di¤erent measurement
of complementarity. If we only observe behaviour, which of the two measurements of true
complementarity should we regard as truer?14
Our behavioural, model-free approach is designed precisely to cut through this type of
modelling dilemmas. It takes choice data at face value. It serves a di¤erent purpose from
standard denitions: it suits the researcher or user who wishes to be non-committal as to
the mechanism that generates behaviour, which is treated as unknown and unknowable.
We view this approach as a complement, rather than as a substitute, of the standard one.
7.2 If you could, should you use Hicks complementarity with
stochastic choice data?
An interesting by-product of our approach is its implication that if prices were available
and consumers were utility maximisers, and therefore the standard Hicks criterion of com-
plementarity could be applied, it would conict with Monotonicity.15 This can be quickly
seen through the following reasoning. Dene Hicksian complementarity with stochastic
demand in the standard way using expected demand. Gentzkow [14] shows that, for the
simple two-good logit model, Hicksian complementarity thus dened is equivalent to the
14Note that some specications of the consideration set model can be rewritten as RUMs while others
cannot.
15We thank Jean-Pierre Dubé for pointing this out to us.
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supermodularity of the utility function. On the other hand, we have shown that the corre-
lation criterion fails Monotonicity. Further, we have shown that the correlation criterion
is equivalent to the supermodularity of utility in the two-good logit model, and therefore
we can conclude that this application of the Hicks criterion may violate Monotonicity.
Because Monotonicity seems such a fundamental principle, we argue that this reason-
ing shows that the Hicks criterion may be ill-applied to the context of random utility.
That is, even when it could be applied because prices are available, the Hicks criterion
should not be uncritically applied to stochastic choice data. To refer to table 1 again,
suppose that the data changed from those in that table, to the following:
Read print Did not read print
Read online 0:487 0:043
Did not read online 0:447 0:023
This can mean for example that for every 1000 people, 350 of the non-readers con-
verted to reading. Each of these new readers reads both versions and none of them reads
just one version. Now the previously positive consumption correlation has turned negative
( 0:487
0:487+0:447
= 0:521 < 0:530 = 0:487 + 0:043). On the assumption that consumption is
generated by a logit random utility model, negative (resp., positive) consumption corre-
lation is, as noted before, equivalent to Hicksian substitutability (resp., complementarity)
using expected demand. But how can the conversion of over one third of the population
to reading jointly the print and the online version be taken as diagnostic of a switch from
complementarity to substitution in the nature of these goods? This seems a perverse
conclusion.
The paradoxical behaviour of the Hicks criterion in this circumstance stems from the
often neglected fact that a parameter (in this case the sign of the Hicksian elasticity) that
is meaningful in the deterministic utility model may not carry the same meaning when
applied to the perturbed utility version of the model. For an analogy, think of the fact
that the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion coe¢cient of a deterministic utility cannot be taken
as a measure of risk aversion in the random utility version of the model (Apesteguia
and Ballester [1], Blavatsky [8], Wilcox [23]): in that case, an individual with a higher
Arrow-Pratt coe¢cient of risk aversion may be more likely to accept risk than one with
a lower coe¢cient. We hope that our analysis helps to reinforce the notion that the
interpretation of certain features of a utility function (such as supermodularity) is not
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necessarily inherited by the stochastic version of that utility. Complementarity criteria
for stochastic choice data should, even if based on utility maximisation, address directly
the stochastic nature of the primitives.
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